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Abstract  
We study the effects of intergovernmental grants on school spending within the 
Finnish system of high school education funding. The system allocates lump-sum 
intergovernmental grants to local education organizers using a kinked grant rule. 
Utilizing the quasi-experimental variation in grants given by the rule, we identify 
the effects of grants on municipal high school education expenditures. Our 
results indicate that grants stimulate spending while local tax rates or revenues do 
not seem to be responsive to grants, thus suggesting the presence of a typical 
flypaper effect. However, we also consider the possibility that grant responses 
might be heterogeneous among municipalities. Based on our heterogeneity 
results, the grant response is positively associated with the share of high school 
age population, while the higher share of elderly is related to a lower propensity 
to spend on education out of grant funding. This result is in line with the idea of 
intergenerational conflict in education spending preferences often presented in 
education finance literature.   
 
Key words: intergovernmental transfers, flypaper effect, heterogeneous spending 
preferences, regression kink design 
JEL classes: I22, H75, H73 
  
  
 
 
1. Introduction 
The effect of intergovernmental transfers on local government spending is a widely studied 
topic in public finance (see e.g. Hines & Thaler, 1995; Gamkhar & Shah, 2007; Inman, 2008 for 
reviews). Most of the debate concerns whether state grants crowd-in (stimulate) or crowd-out 
local spending (see e.g. Payne, 2009).1 According to the standard median voter theory, transfers 
to the lower tiers of government should have a similar effect to local spending than equally sized 
increases in the local incomes. However, empirical studies have generally found that the effect 
of grants on spending is significantly larger than the effect of local incomes. This phenomenon 
has been dubbed as the flypaper effect since the grant money sticks for spending and does not 
translate into tax cuts for local residents.  
Plenty of research has also examined the effects of education grants to the local 
education spending (see e.g. Fisher & Papke, 2000 for a review of earlier literature). The 
challenge however has been that grants are typically endogeneous in spending equations and 
earlier literature could not address this problem convincingly. As a consequence, more recent 
empirical analyses of education funding have adopted quasi-experimental identification 
strategies utilizing school finance reforms or funding formulas in order to identify the causal 
effects of grants on local spending (see e.g. Hoxby, 2001; Guryan, 2001; Card & Payne, 2002; 
Gordon, 2004; Baicker & Gordon, 2006; Cascio et al., 2013). It is worth noting that in many 
countries education funding is arranged through formula-based funding rules, which might 
enable the utilization of such quasi-experimental methods (see e.g. European Commission, 
2014). This is the case also in Finland in terms of its high school (or general upper secondary 
school) funding, while there is no corresponding rule in other layers of education system. Yet, to 
our knowledge, there are no previous quasi-experimental or even descriptive studies looking at 
the relationship between education grants and local education spending in the context of 
                                                 
1 We use the terms ‘transfer’ and ‘grant’ interchangeably in this paper.  
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Finnish high schools.2 Thus, there is a dire need for Finnish evidence on the effects of grants on 
school expenditure based on credible identification strategy utilized in the recent literature.  
Despite the abundance of flypaper research, heterogeneous grant responses have 
received less attention. Especially the age structure of localities has not been considered as the 
leading candidate to explain the effect heterogeneity.3 However, beyond the realm of flypaper 
literature, there is a plethora of research owing much to Poterba (1996, 1998) studying variations 
in local preferences towards public education spending due to demographic composition of 
localities. Generally the empirical consensus has supported the intergenerational conflict 
hypothesis, which posits that a larger share of elderly population significantly decreases the 
support for education expenditures (see e.g. Brunner & Johnson, 2016; de Mello et al., 2016; 
Cattaneo & Wolter, 2009; Reback, 2015; Figlio & Fletcher, 2012; Fletcher & Kenny, 2008; 
Brunner & Baldson, 2004). Nevertheless, to our knowledge, there has been surprisingly little 
overlap between the intergenerational conflict and intergovernmental transfer literatures, as only 
few studies consider preference heterogeneity due the demographics in the education grant 
context. For example Mattos et al. (2017), Cascio et al. (2013), and Ahlin and Mörk (2008) all do 
examine education grant effect heterogeneity, but none of them consider age structure as a 
driver of this heterogeneity. In Baicker and Gordon (2006) and Dahlberg et al. (2008) on the 
other hand, age structure heterogeneity is only cursorily examined.  
This study is one step forward to fill the abovementioned gaps in the literature. 
Our contribution is twofold. First, we explore the heterogeneity among Finnish municipalities in 
their high school grant responses utilizing a quasi-experimental research design. In the Finnish 
system, high school funding is based on a formula funding rule where the unit price of a single 
                                                 
2 In the Finnish context, only Lundqvist (2015) has examined the effects of general intergovernmental grants using 
a more convincing quasi-experimental research design. However, she does not consider high school education 
funding and she also utilizes different identification strategy (differences-in-differences). 
3 Some other suggested mechanisms behind heterogeneous responses include: voter information (Strumpf, 1998), 
interest groups (Singhal, 2008), democratic responsiveness of local government and income levels of municipality 
(Lutz, 2010), local ability to offset grants through taxation (Cascio et al., 2013), budgetary constraints (Brooks & 
Phillips, 2008), property ownership (Rockoff, 2010), distortionary taxation (Vegh & Vuletin, 2016), and local fiscal 
conditions (Ando, 2015a).  
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student for smaller high school organizers is increased in a piece-wise linear manner. As this 
piece-wise linear pricing rule is kinked at certain student thresholds, this allows us to utilize the 
regression kink design popularized and formalized by Card et al. (2015b). Since the main 
identification assumptions seem to hold at the threshold we focus on, the variation in grants can 
be considered random near the threshold. This exogenous variation enables us to infer the 
causal effect of unconditional high school grants on local high school expenditures. Second, we 
add to the very narrow empirical literature on Finnish intergovernmental grants. The scarce 
existing literature is outdated in the sense that they examine grant systems which were in place 
during the 1990s using only descriptive methods (see Oulasvirta, 1997; Moisio, 2002). Instead 
we focus to the part of the grant system that has been in place for a relatively long time and is 
still in use. The more recent addition to the literature by Lundqvist (2015) significantly improves 
the empirical methods compared to earlier studies, but she also deals a period of time from 
which the general grant system has been reformed since. Moreover, Lundqvist mainly studies 
local spending as a whole and we on the other hand focus on high school sector. Thus we can 
consider heterogeneity in spending preferences within this sector in more detail and are able to 
provide a somewhat more nuanced view of possible mechanisms behind the possibly 
heterogeneous high school grant responses. Our main results indicate the presence of flypaper 
effect and it seems that in municipalities with larger share of elderly population, high school 
spending responds less to education grants suggesting that there is indeed demographic 
heterogeneity in this effect.   
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we summarize the main aspects of 
the Finnish high school funding system. In section 3 we describe the research design and 
identification strategy which the funding system gives rise to. The data and the validity of our 
research design are examined in section 4. The estimation results concerning the flypaper effect 
are presented in section 5. Section 6 focuses to the heterogeneous effects of grants. Section 7 
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concludes. Note that throughout the text we will refer to appendix material for additional 
details. We will denote the different sections of this material as AP-1, AP-2, and so forth.      
2. The Finnish high school system and funding 
2.1. High school education in Finland and the funding system 
In Finland, basic compulsory education consist grades 1-6 (primary school) and grades 7-9 
(middle school), after which students generally progress to upper secondary schooling. In this 
paper, we will concentrate on the academic track of upper secondary school, which we will, for 
brevity, refer as high school. The funding system we investigate concerns only high schools (or 
academic track of upper secondary school), while vocational upper secondary schools have 
different funding system. Typically municipalities organize high school education but also 
private institutions, municipality co-operatives and university practice schools offer high school 
education.4 Larger municipalities generally have multiple high schools. Since the funding 
mechanism applies to organizers, not to the individual schools, it is important to differentiate 
between the two.   
The funding of local public services is divided between the state and the local 
governments. The local financing of services is mainly based on a flat rate municipal income tax 
set by the municipalities themselves.  For high school education, state allocates transfers 
distributed by the Ministry of Education and Culture. In accounting sense these high school 
transfers are distributed separately from a larger transfer system maintained by the Ministry of 
Finance, where the state funds the provision of other core public services such as basic 
education and healthcare. Importantly the high school grant is not tied to any specific purpose, 
                                                 
4 Practice schools offer teaching orientation for university students studying to become a teacher. Since their 
funding is part of the university budget, not part of municipal funding decisions, we exclude these schools from our 
analysis. Also municipality co-operatives are excluded since their decision making is beyond any single municipality. 
While private institutions are within the same funding system as municipal high schools, we exclude also them from 
the analysis as they are fully funded by the state transfers and have no equivalent source of own funding as 
municipals have in local taxes as private institutions cannot collect any tuition fees.  
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even though it is nominally labelled and distributed as a high school grant. Consequently 
municipal organizers have also the possibility to divert the state transfers to other uses.  
The level of high school grant is mainly determined by the number of students 
each organizer have in the beginning of a school year. A naïve implementation of fixed 
reimbursement per student would however place organizers of different size in a rather unequal 
position in terms of funding. The size of the pool of student seeking admittance to high schools 
across areas varies greatly because Finland is characterized with very unevenly distributed 
population among urban centers and rural areas. Moreover prospective students are free to 
choose any school they wish. Thus the larger selection of schools in urban areas may further 
reduce the size of student pool for rural schools.  This limits the possible economies of scale 
from which smaller organizers is able to benefit. All organizers must however meet certain 
national curricula criteria and offer the basic student services (e.g. lunches and school health 
care) regardless of their size. Consequently smaller organizers cannot respond to a smaller 
student pool by cutting back the level of teaching and services they offer. Thus the expenditures 
per student are higher for smaller organizers. The funding system attempts to account for this 
by providing more funding to smaller organizers, as described in the next section.  
 
2.2 The funding system and grant formula 
The funding given to the high school organizers is based is a product of the number of students 
and the organizer specific unit price of a single student, defined as in Equation (1).  
 
(100 )
100 100
it a it a
it
M N p m N pp        (1) 
In Equation 1, itp  is the unit price for organizer i in year t. The first component of it, ap , is the 
national average unit price based on actual realized costs of some predetermined range of 
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previous year(s) and it is set by the Finnish National Board of Education. Certain budgetary, 
legislative and index corrections may be applied when setting this average price.5  N is a national 
multiplier that smooths out the mechanic changes in the average price ap  due to the changes in 
organizer specific prices. Since both ap  and N are constant across all organizers, they are of 
little consequence for our analysis and we omit the further details of them. The variation in unit 
price is caused by the multiplier itM  given in Equations 2 and 3, where ݏ௧ିଵ is the number of 
students observed in the fall of year t-1 (the start of academic year). The multiplier visualized in 
Fig. 1.  Currently the limit of 200 students is used as the critical threshold below which 
increments to unit price apply. This system of incremental funding has been in place from year 
1999 onwards. Any official documents did not reveal the origins of this limit but we assume that 
it has been set relatively arbitrarily as a result of political negotiations. It is however worthwhile 
to note that high schools in Finland most commonly are in the size range of 100-299.6 This 
might have partly directed the choice of the threshold.  There is also another threshold at 60 
students which entitles institutions for even higher multiplier, with a cap at 40 students.  
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 (3) 
                                                 
5 For the year 2016 the average price was set at 6122.06 €/student.  
6 In 1999 and 2000, around 48% of the high schools fell to this range. While the share has declined over the years, 
100-299 school size is still the most common. Source: http://www.oph.fi/julkaisut/2003/indikaattorit_2003 
(Report of National Board of Education, 2003).     
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thresholds are exogenous, the variation in grants near the threshold can be considered as good 
as random. Note that our design is a fuzzy design, due to the fiscal year adjustment and some 
discretionary components in the unit price which account for extra expenditures needs due to 
special tasks (e.g. placing emphasis on some fields such as sports or math/science) or multi-
language teaching.  
ܻ ൌ ߬ܤ ൅ ݃ሺܵሻ ൅ ߝ (4)  
௜ܻ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܤ෠௜௧+∑ ߛ௣ሾ ௜ܵ௧ െ ݏ଴ሿ௣௣∗௣ୀଵ ൅ ߝ௜௧ (5) 
ܤ௜௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵሺܼ ∗ ሾ ௜ܵ௧ െ ݏ଴ሿሻ ൅ ∑ ߙ௣ܼ ∗ ሾ ௜ܵ௧ െ ݏ଴ሿ௣௣∗௣ୀଶ ൅ ∑ ߜ௣ሾ ௜ܵ௧ െ ݏ଴ሿ௣௣∗௣ୀଵ ൅ ߟ௜௧  (6) 
The estimation of    generally applies local linear regression on both sides of  the threshold 
using a bandwidth (h) of observations around the threshold. We take an agnostic view and 
alternate the bandwidth over a wide range of values. We use uniform kernel, thus effectively 
translating the estimation into a standard IV-estimator shown in Equations 5 and 6, where 
ሾ ௜ܵ௧ െ ݏ଴ሿ is the number of students centered around the kink point ሺݏ଴ሻ and ܼ ൌ ࡵሾ ௜ܵ௧ ൒ ݏ଴ሿ. 
Their interaction term (and the possible higher order terms of it) is the excluded instrument. 
Initially we use several different polynomial orders (p) for the control function ݃ሺ. ሻ, but for 
reasons stated later, we will focus to the first order specification. The key identifying assumption 
after controlling for this smooth relationship (control function) is that any kinked relationship 
between the expenditures and number of  students is due to the kinked grant formula. This 
requires that both the density of  the running variable and all other covariates evolve smoothly 
through the kink point.8 Thus the point estimate of  interest should not change much when 
additional covariates are included if  the design is valid.  
 
                                                 
8 To be accurate, RKD requires that the density of the running variable is continuously differentiable at the kink 
point, which implies the derivative of the density at the kink point is continuous.  
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4. Data and the validity of design 
4.1 Data  
Original dataset is an unbalanced panel of all high school education organizers from years 2001-
2014 but we focus only to municipal organizers.9  We use the municipal division of each 
corresponding year in order to include also organizers that do not exist anymore in 2014. We 
have data on total high school expenditures, grants (both per student), and the number of 
students, obtained from the National Board of Education funding data repository. The funding 
data is merged with the data on municipal level characteristics, which is obtained from Statistics 
Finland. This data includes data on the number of high schools, municipal tax rates and tax 
revenues, other state transfers, the average income level of residents, demographic data (years 
2003-2014 only)10, expenses on social and healthcare costs (SOHC) and political variables 
related to municipal elections. All data is publicly available on the webpages of abovementioned 
data providers.11      
Unfortunately we cannot attribute expenditures to single schools when organizer 
has many schools since the funding data is at the organizer level. In such cases the observed 
expenditures do not necessarily reflect actual spending behavior of any individual school as 
there can be large within organizer expenditure differences between schools. Thus we focus on 
municipal organizers with one school. This restriction results in total of 2904 observations in 
the raw sample. We however do check whether our results are affected if we include organizers 
with multiple schools (see Häkkinen et al., 2003). Note that not many such organizers are under 
the influence of formula as they are generally much larger than 200 students.  
                                                 
9From the total 323 organizers observed at any point of time, there are 32 private organizers and 286 municipal 
organizers. The remaining 5 institutions are run by joint municipal organizers. University practice high schools are 
not included in the funding data at all as they are not within the same funding system.   
10 In order to increase the sample size, our estimations use versions of the demographic variables where missing 
values in years 2001-2002 have been replace with the year 2003 values. The demographic composition of the 
municipality is anyhow unlikely to change much within in timespan of few years. The main results using our 
preferred specification in Section 5 are very similar if we restrict our estimation sample to cover only years 2003-
2014.  
11 See further details from the data description appendix AP9 and the following webpages: National Board of 
Education funding data repository: https://vos.oph.fi/rap/ ; Statistics Finland: http://stat.fi/   
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The summary statistics are shown in Table 1. All the monetary variables have 
been deflated to 2014 euros. The size of organizers varies from two students to over a thousand 
(additional summary statistics in AP1). On average the observed expenditures per student are 
about 1017 euros higher than the grants (difference variable), implying that organizers would 
supplement the grant with their own funding. For some organizers the difference is however 
negative, indicating that these organizers divert the grant money elsewhere. In AP2 we conduct 
a correlation analysis among some of our key variables to provide additional insights on how 
municipal characteristics move together. 
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Table 1 Summary statistics of key variables (over years 2001-2014; demographic data 2003-2014) 
 
Variable N Mean SD Median Min Max
High school education costs, €/student 2904 8347.05 3309.97 7705.27 4569.58 71814.11
Grant €/student 2904 7330.57 2167.37 6936.30 4932.48 29956.80
Cost vs. Grant difference, €/student 2904 1016.51 1968.99 819.05 -2899.11 53526.92
Students (previous fall) 2904 170.64 126.62 138.00 2.00 1014.00
SOHC net costs €/residenta 2904 3338.90 537.51 3260.18 2208.30 5679.00
Tax income €/resident 2904 3030.92 446.21 2964.51 2080.68 7144.98
Population 2416 8887.49 6865.03 6837.00 1063.00 40390.00
0-14 year olds, share of total 2416 0.17 0.04 0.16 0.09 0.35
15-19 year olds, share of total 2416 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.10
20-24 year olds, share of total 2416 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.09
Over 65 year olds, share of total 2416 0.21 0.05 0.21 0.06 0.40
Municipal election vote turnoutb 598 63.24 5.25 62.70 42.00 84.90
Municipal loan stock, €/resident 2843 1843.72 1091.98 1735.40 1.13 6444.00
Municipal income tax rate 2904 19.21 0.93 19.00 16.00 22.50
Size of local councilb  596 30.54 8.26 27.00 15.00 75.00
Taxable income, t-1, €/resident 2894 12637.04 2125.82 12253.87 8063.38 27553.40
Other state transfers, €/resident 2904 2278.06 849.69 2280.27 222.90 5416.00
Municipal staff (per 1000 residents) 2900 62.04 15.50 61.00 4.00 133.00
 
Note: Municipal organizers with one school included. SOHC net costs are the difference between the gross 
operating cost and operating income. Note also that municipal elections are held every four years. In our data they 
occur at 2004, 2008 and 2012. In the actual estimations we use versions of the variables such that all year within 
single electoral cycle gets the values observed on the years of last elections.    
 
4.2 Validity of the research design 
First we check the distribution of running variable. In Fig. 3 we plot its distribution of bin 
means of frequencies with the bin width of 2 for organizers with less than 500 students. The 
distribution runs smoothly through the thresholds of 40 and 200 students but in the former case 
12
 
 
there are relatively few observations for a meaningful analysis. At the threshold of 60 the 
distribution has a jump, thus casting a doubt whether the design is valid at this point.12 The 
formal statistical tests of smoothness can found in AP3. These tests indicate that concentrating 
on the threshold of 200 is warranted.    
Despite the formal tests indicate a smooth density at the 200 threshold one may 
argue that the running variable is still suspect to manipulation as organizers can obviously alter 
the student intake. In our view, incentives for such manipulation are however low. While 
organizers get higher unit price below the threshold, they also lose funding from students that 
do not enroll. Consider for example a school that has 201 students. Let us also assume the 
average unit price is roughly on its’ 2016 level at 6100 euros per student and that the school has 
no special components in its’ funding. The total grant funding would be 1 226 100 euros 
(201*6100 €). If the organizer decides to manipulate its enrollment below 200, let us say to 190 
students, indeed by Formula (3), the unit price would increase to 6344 euros. The total funding 
would however fall to 1 205 360 euros (190*6344 €). Thus purely from the formula perspective 
there should be no incentives for manipulation. Of course 11 students less would imply also 
savings but it is unlikely that actual savings or costs for that matter would strictly follow the 
formula. For example teaching expenditures are difficult to adjust smoothly. In practice a school 
of 190 students probably requires as much teaching resources to run as a school of 201 
students, since a qualified teacher on each subject would need to be hired anyway. Moreover, 
because prospective students can seek admittance to any school they wish, the allocation of 
students to schools can be considered random also from this perspective.     
                                                 
12 The jump at the proximity of the 60 threshold might be partly explained by the fact that typical high school 
education lasts three years/grades, whereas at the same time there is a tendency to gravitate class sizes towards 
twenty students in Finland.  
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variable (see also AP5). We use both 1st or 3rd order polynomial control functions and include 
year and regional (county) fixed effects.14 For these estimations we use the Calonico et al. (2016) 
bandwidth selector (CCFT bandwidth hereafter). Only share of high school age population and 
general grants are marginally significant at the 5% significance level and the significance depends 
highly from the order of the polynomial control. In Table 3 we check the effects at three 
different placebo thresholds by running a linear regression where grants per student are 
explained both with formula induced slope changes and placebo slope changes at points 150, 
300 and 500. None of the placebo thresholds are significant and the slope changes at kinks 40, 
60, and 200 have significant and expected signs.   
  
                                                 
14 Results using 2nd order polynomial were similar and can be obtained from the authors by request. Note also that 
we use regional rather than municipal (organizers) fixed effects since the research design utilizes the cross sectional 
variation among municipalities. In addition we examine covariate balance with the covariate index approach 
suggested by Card et al. (2016). These results can be found in AP5.   
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Table 2 Covariate balance tests at threshold of 200 students 
 
1st order 3rd order 
Variable RK effect Robust p-val RK effect Robust p-val
0-14 year olds, % of total 0.000 0.233 0.003 0.168
15-19 year olds, % of total 0.000 0.044 0.000 0.901
Over 65 year olds, % of total 0.000 0.230 -0.003 0.165
Population 25.286 0.306 155.760 0.235
Average taxable income €/resident 2.259 0.856 149.886 0.071
Tax revenue €/resident 1.975 0.422 24.330 0.117
SOHC net costs €/resident 1.824 0.491 -15.918 0.347
Municipal council size -0.011 0.762 -0.050 0.789
Municipal election vote turnout -0.053 0.154 -0.173 0.341
Politcal orientation 0.001 0.819 -0.008 0.707
Swedish teaching 0.001 0.585 -0.001 0.844
Loan stock, €/resident 3.313 0.645 9.276 0.835
General state grants, €/resident 0.239 0.956 -54.233 0.039
Municipal staff 0.011 0.911 0.651 0.299
 
Note: Municipal organizers with one school included. Standard errors were clustered at the municipal level. CCFT 
optimal bandwidth used here is 44.78. 
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Table 3 Placebo thresholds 
No controls Controls
Slope change Coefficient S.E. P-value Slope change Coefficient S.E. P-value
K40 -235.63 33.48 0.00 K40 -195.49 17.10 0.00
K60 215.57 34.31 0.00 K60 178.11 18.27 0.00
K200 22.70 2.23 0.00 K200 21.93 2.39 0.00
K150 -3.26 2.99 0.28 K150 -4.37 3.24 0.18
K300 0.51 0.91 0.58 K300 -0.19 1.22 0.88
K500 0.15 0.76 0.85 K500 -0.18 1.00 0.86
 
Note: Standard errors clustered at the municipal level. All models include year and regional fixed effects and only 
municipal organizers with one school are included. The set of controls includes the variables from Table 3. 
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1 Flypaper results 
In this section we present our main flypaper results. We consider three different model 
specifications which are labelled as A, B, and C. Specification A is the baseline and it has only 
grants on right-hand side, whereas B adds the set of control variables and C adds the regional 
(county) fixed effects to B. All specifications control for the smooth function of the number of 
students and include year fixed effects. We use regional rather than municipal fixed effects as we 
want to utilize the cross-sectional variation among organizers in identification. Standard errors 
are clustered at the municipal level. Monetary variables are in levels since the propensity to 
spend out of grant money corresponds to a grant coefficient estimated in levels (see e.g. Fisher, 
1982).15 The set of controls includes a standard set of municipal level socio-economic and 
political variables commonly applied in literature (see e.g. Baskaran, 2016; Ferede & Islam, 2015; 
Lundqvist, 2015; Gennari and Messina, 2014). We use the share of population of three different 
                                                 
15Some authors have suggested that flypaper effects should be estimated with log-linear specification (Becker, 1996; 
Worthington & Dollery, 1999; Melo, 2002). Since most of the flypaper literature however uses level specification, 
we follow the same tradition for better comparison.   
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age groups (0-14, 15-19, and over 65 years old), total population, SOCH-costs, taxable incomes 
in previous year, and tax revenues to account for the fiscal capacity of the municipality, and a 
dummy variable if municipality offer teaching in Swedish. For political controls we use voter 
turnout in municipal elections, size of the local council, and a dummy whether the main left 
wing party gained higher share of votes in municipal elections than the main right wing party.     
Results are shown in Fig. 6 (p=1 left panel, p=2 right panel). To avoid distortion 
in figures, we omit coefficient estimates for which the absolute value of the 95% confidence 
interval limits is above 2 and for which there are too few observations per estimated parameter 
using a rule of thumb ‘ten observations per parameter’ (small bandwidths). We report only 
bandwidths below 140 since beyond that we would confound the effect of the kinks 60 and 200 
with each other. The bandwidth value is the length on one side of the threshold, thus the total 
length is twice this value. 
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and near zero coefficient estimates on average. The 3rd order polynomial specification (see AP6, 
Fig. A5) produces positive coefficients on average but the estimates are quite imprecise. The 
poor performance of higher order models has been noted for example by Card et al. (2016) who 
seem to favor 1st order specification (see also Ando, 2015b; Gelman & Imbens, 2014). We 
examine this issue more closely in the next section. The inclusion of covariates (specifications B 
& C) generally results somewhat smaller coefficient estimates on average, but with the 1st order 
polynomial specification, the results stay relatively robust as mean beta values are around 0.5-0.6 
in all specifications. As expected, small bandwidth values produce volatile and imprecise results. 
With bandwidths from 75 to 100, we see relatively robust positive coefficients, whereas with 
larger bandwidths there is a slight detectable increasing trend in coefficient estimates towards 
unity. This trend is probably due to the fact that the grant correspondence with expenditures is 
higher among the larger organizers. Following these baseline results we conclude that while the 
results are rather sensitive both to bandwidth and to polynomial order, our preferred 
specification (1st order polynomial) suggest a relatively robust grant effect of around 0.5-0.6 with 
reasonable bandwidths. Interpreted in monetary terms this would imply that 1 € of additional 
grant money stimulate spending by 50-60 euro cents.     
             
5.2 First stage results and additional robustness checks 
Above we noted that the higher order polynomial specifications performed very differently 
from the first order specification. Often this might be due to poor first stage of IV as higher 
order may suffer from a problem of weak identification. Thus in Table 4 we present the 
coefficient estimates of the first stage along with its significance and the Kleibergen-Paap (K-P) 
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test statistic for weak identification test (see e.g. Baum et al., 2007).16 We present these results 
for all three polynomial orders and for both specifications A and C. 
Table 4 First stage results and weak identification test 
Specification A Specification C 
  
1st stage coefficient 1st stage coefficient 
Polynomial order   Polynomial order 
BW 1 2 3 BW 1 2 3 
25 18.60*** 10.69 52.24* 25 21.23*** 10.13 50.29* 
50 23.20*** 14.02 3.722 50 22.00*** 12.82 1.171 
75 21.73*** 26.15** 4.695 75 21.27*** 23.02*** 4.868 
100 20.22*** 24.99*** 24.77* 100 19.98*** 22.95*** 22.95** 
125 19.63*** 23.07*** 27.23* 125 19.98*** 21.70*** 24.83** 
  
K-P stat.  K-P stat.  
Polynomial order   Polynomial order 
BW 1 2 3 BW 1 2 3 
25 15 0.40 2.28 25 37.29 0.32 2.56 
50 30.83 3.00 1.11 50 36.36 4.92 1.37 
75 86.96 4.38 3.99 75 76.31 7.32 4.72 
100 244.7 7.48 4.37 100 258.4 7.05 5.84 
125 296 16.68 14.44 125 477.6 15.91 16.39 
 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
The first stage results are non-robust with smaller bandwidths and higher order polynomials. 
With larger bandwidths all polynomial orders provide a significant coefficient for the 1st order 
instrument (the interaction ܼ ∗ ሾ ௜ܵ௧ െ ݏ଴ሿ  in Equation 6). However the addition of possibly 
irrelevant higher order instruments leads to a weak identification problem as indicated by low 
K-P statistics. Using the Staiger and Stock (1997) rule of thumb, only the 1st order specification 
consistently produces test statistics higher than 10 (see also Baum et al., 2007) suggesting 
preference towards this polynomial order.  Furthermore the results are robust between the 
                                                 
16 We report Kleibergen-Paap statistic instead of the usual Gragg-Donald statistic as the former is robust to within 
cluster correlation. 
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specifications A and C. Thus we focus to the specification A with 1st order polynomial control 
function in our subsequent analysis. 
 Table 5 presents several robustness tests using bandwidth values of 50, 75 and 
100. The results (1) reproduce the estimates for model A1 at these bandwidths, while robustness 
checks from (2) to (4) use the baseline specification but modify estimation sample or the used 
fixed effects. Results in (5) reproduce C1 and (6) adds three additional controls, namely number 
municipal of staff, and other state transfers and loan stock per resident, while (7) omits years 
2001-2002. Overall these robustness checks indicate that results are quite stable. Adding 
organizers with many schools in (3) has also only small effect as expected. There are not many 
organizers with multiple schools around the 200 student threshold.  
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Table 5 Robustness checks 
(1) Baseline; 1st order, specification A 
Bandwidth Coefficient SE P-val N 
50 0.544 0.231 0.020 782 
75 0.625 0.178 0.001 1196 
100 0.631 0.132 0.000 1627 
(2) A1+Excluding years 2001 and 2002  
Bandwidth Coefficient SE P-val N 
50 0.625 0.247 0.013 615 
75 0.675 0.179 0.000 969 
100 0.687 0.135 0.000 1332 
(3) A1+ Organizers with many schools included 
Bandwidth Coefficient SE P-val N 
50 0.493 0.292 0.094 841 
75 0.633 0.176 0.000 1289 
100 0.607 0.135 0.000 1739 
 
(4) A1+Regional FEs added 
Bandwidth Coefficient SE P-val N 
50 0.519 0.250 0.040 782 
75 0.689 0.172 0.000 1196 
100 0.689 0.128 0.000 1627 
(5) Specification C1  
Bandwidth Coefficient SE P-val N 
50 0.280 0.225 0.215 765 
75 0.511 0.162 0.002 1161 
100 0.617 0.134 0.000 1585 
 
(6) Specification C1 with added controls 
Bandwidth Coefficient SE P-val N 
50 0.278 0.216 0.199 759 
75 0.528 0.161 0.001 1150 
100 0.636 0.133 0.000 1559 
(7) Specification C1 excluding years 2001 and 2002 
Bandwidth Coefficient SE P-val N 
50 0.275 0.273 0.316 603 
75 0.506 0.158 0.002 943 
100 0.603 0.134 0.000 1303 
 
5.3 Grant effects on other outcomes 
Results so far suggest that high school grants contribute positively to local high school 
spending. Whether this indicates flypaper effect depends also from the size of the income effect. 
The challenge is the lack of good research design for incomes. One option is just to look at the 
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coefficient estimate of the income variable when it is included as a control. In AP we present 
these income estimates from previously reported Model C1. The results suggest that taxable 
income has little effect on spending but we wary putting too much stress on this result. Earlier 
findings do not offer much guidance either about the possible magnitude of the income effect 
on local spending in Finland. Only Oulasvirta (1997) and Moisio (2002) have provided some 
estimates, suggesting that the effect of income is order of magnitude smaller than effect of 
grants. Elsewhere, recent results by Gennari and Messina (2014), Ferede and Islam (2015), and 
Dahlby and Ferede (2016) all suggest that while grant effect is in the order of magnitude 10-1, 
the income effects often fall to the order of magnitudes of 10-2 or even 10-3.      
In the absence of a good research design for income variable, studies often 
examine whether local tax rates or tax revenues respond to grants (see e.g. Baskaran, 2016; 
Lundqvist, 2015; Dahlberg et al., 2008). In the first panel of Fig. 7 we explain the municipal 
income tax rate with grants and find insignificant results. Variation in spending may also occur 
because there are changes in the tax base. While grant seems to have a positive effect on average 
on tax revenues, this effect is hardly significant and is much smaller than the grant effect on 
spending (second panel in Fig. 7). Last, it is possible that municipalities just divert grant money 
elsewhere than to education. The last panel in Fig. 7 examines the high school grant’s effect on 
social and healthcare spending. Based on the results, municipalities may slightly increase their 
SOHC spending as a result of high school grant but this effect is small relative to its’ effect on 
high school spending and often statistically insignificant.  
Our results can be compared to Lundqvist (2015) who found a significant 
negative correlation of general grants with tax revenues also using Finnish data. This 
relationship was however much smaller than between general grants and expenditures, 
suggesting the presence of flypaper effect. She also found that the basic education grants had no 
bearing on tax revenues, even though the basic education is an expense category much larger 
than high school education. Interestingly school expenditure increases were more associated 
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with labelled grants than with unlabeled grants. According to Lundqvist, potential explanation 
behind this observation is that nominal labelling of grants might direct spending decisions even 
though grant is not tied to any specific purpose. Thus in our case it is possible that the grant 
formula acts as de facto binding restraint for the local decision makers not to divert funding 
outside high school education. 
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6. Heterogeneous local responses to high school education grants  
In this section, we examine the heterogeneous spending responses to high school grants. We do 
this by dividing the data into subsamples according to some municipal characteristics, replicating 
the earlier estimations (with specification A1) for these subsamples, and looking for any 
differences between the grant coefficients between these subsamples. Due to sample split, we 
cannot consider very short bandwidths and based on our visual observation of earlier results we 
use the bandwidth of 75.  
Before results, let us briefly discuss the municipal characteristic that we consider 
as the potential sources of heterogeneity. To test the intergenerational conflict hypothesis, we 
use the share of 65 year old population in the municipality, a variable used also in many other 
studies examining the intergenerational conflict issue. For consistency check, we also use the 
share of 15-19 year old population in the municipality. We would expect that estimations using 
these two variables would produce opposing results. In addition to demographics, we examine 
also other possible sources of heterogeneity identified earlier in the literature.    
First, following Vegh and Vuletin (2016), we divide the sample by different tax 
rates. According to Vegh and Vuletin (2016), with higher tax rates, the higher resulting tax 
distortion induces to spend more from transfers than from incomes (see also Dahlby and 
Ferede, 2016). Second, we examine sub samples with respect to income levels as the ability of 
municipality to offset local funding by grants may depend from it (Lutz, 2010). Third, we 
consider whether political participation (voter turnout) of citizens affects how municipalities 
respond to grant. For example Borge et al. (2008) and Geys et al. (2010) have provided evidence 
that local government (cost) efficiency is positively related to higher voter turnout due to higher 
accountability. This effect is larger, the larger the degree of local fiscal autonomy is.17 Fourth, we 
divide the sample with respect to SOHC-costs. For example de Mello et al. (2016) find that 
                                                 
17 Martin (2003) has pointed out that in US, the members of the congress may have distribute federal funding 
towards areas with higher voter turnout as these areas are more likely to provide future support for them.   
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areas with higher elderly share prefer higher healthcare expenditures over education 
expenditures. Last, the size of the municipal council might affect preferences towards spending. 
For example, Egger and Koethenbuerger (2010) found that larger councils tend to spend more, 
consistent with the standard fiscal commons problem. Petterson-Lidbom (2012) on the other 
hand found that the size of local council negatively affects the local spending using both 
Swedish and Finnish data. According to him, larger councils are in better position to supervise 
the budget maximizing bureaucrats who often have considerable power in setting the actual 
spending agenda.18  
Except for tax rates and council size, the data is divided into two subsamples 
based on the median value of given variable among municipal organizers. Since tax rate and 
council size change discretely, there is a large group of observations that fall on the exact 
median. In these cases we divide the sample into three groups, the additional group being the 
median group. The results for the subsample analysis are presented in Table 6.  
  
                                                 
18 The composition of municipal councils can also matter. A recent study by Hyytinen et al. (2017) finds that the 
higher number of health care sector public employees in the Finnish municipal councils induces the councils to 
spend more on the health care sector. This is likely also in the case for educational sector employees.    
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Table 6 Heterogeneous grant responses 
 
Variable Median Grant effect 
when below 
median 
Obs. Grant effect when 
above median 
Obs. 
Share of 65 year old and higher (0-1) 0.201 0.665*** 643 0.377 553 
  (0.187) (0.309) 
Share of 15-19 year old (0-1) 0.063 0.404 444 0.697** 752 
  (0.267) (0.209) 
Voter turnout (%) 62.00 0.193 541 0.890*** 655 
  (0.273) (0.221) 
Taxable Income (€/resident) 12805.92 0.459 648 0.869*** 548 
  (0.301) (0.199) 
SOHC-costs (€/resident) 3251.818 0.608** 754 0.497 442 
  (0.184) (0.364) 
Municipal tax rate % (median=19)           
Below median   0.465 478 
  (0.279) 
At the median    0.788** 242 
  (0.296) 
Above median   0.667** 476 
  (0.250) 
Council size (median=35)   
Below median   0.989*** 468     
  (0.193) 
At the median    0.624* 597 
  (0.294) 
Above median   0.330 131 
  (0.407) 
 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Note: Median calculated among all municipal organizers, but estimation results include only municipal organizers 
with one school. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level in parentheses. Bandwidth: 75, polynomial 
order: 1, specification: A in all estimations. 
For the municipalities with larger than median share of elderly, the response to grants is 
statistically insignificant. On the other hand, the municipalities that have lower than median 
share of elderly have relatively large and significant response. We interpret this so that in 
municipalities with high share of elderly, high school spending does not respond to additional 
grants so much as they probably divert the money to other uses. When we divide the sample 
according to the share of 15-19 year old population, the magnitude and the significance of the 
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coefficients is reversed, as expected. Now the municipalities with higher share of high school 
age population respond more to grants. The results hold for various bandwidths (see AP7). 
These results provide support for the intergenerational conflict hypothesis in the sense that 
demographically older areas seem to direct less grant funding towards education.           
Considering voter turnout, the results imply that the higher the turnout is, the 
larger is the grant response as councilors may feel stringer accountability in their spending 
decisions under the higher control by the electorate. The higher incidence of grants in high 
income municipalities suggest that these municipalities do not need to shift state funding to 
other areas. Also the demand for education is also likely to be higher in these areas. With respect 
to tax rate, a higher tax rate seems to be related to a larger grant effect. According to Dahlby 
and Ferede (2016), higher taxation is related to larger marginal costs of public funding, which 
again is related to a higher degree of flypaper effect.  
      The sample split in terms of SOHC-costs produces expected results assuming 
that aging municipalities prefer SOHC-costs over education costs. The size of the local council 
seems to affect differently than what Egger & Koethenbuerger (2010) found. Our results 
indicate that grant response in municipalities with smaller councils is much higher. One possible 
explanation may be that in smaller councils the public (education) employees who are councilors 
exert more influence on how the grant should be used (see Hyytinen et al., 2017). The 
mechanism offered by Petterson-Lidbom (2012) also coincides with our results as in 
municipalities with smaller councils the administrative (education) bureaucrats may have more 
influence on how the funds are spent. Here it is also good to note that council size is directly 
determined by the municipality size. Thus our result might simply reflect the fact that smaller 
municipalities generally spend more in per student terms which again might explain the higher 
level of grant incidence.    
 There are however some caveats to these heterogeneity results. First, the 
measured municipal characteristics may mask the actual mechanism causing heterogeneity. For 
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example voter turnout does not reveal who in fact votes although the mechanism probably runs 
through the composition of the active electorate (see e.g. Fletcher & Kenny, 2008). 
Demographic characteristics alone on the other hand do not necessarily capture that elderly may 
actually prefer education spending due to altruistic reasons or because of possible increases in 
property values. Moreover, many of the municipal characteristic go hand in hand, thus it might 
be difficult to pinpoint the origins of heterogeneity to any single municipal characteristic. 
Second, small sample sizes lead to relatively large standard errors for the coefficient estimates, 
suggesting that not all of the differences between coefficients are statistically significant. Lastly, 
we have taken for granted here that the identification assumption of our design is valid in each 
of the subsample. Despite these caveats, the heterogeneity results suggest that the current policy 
of not tying the grants to any specific use seems well grounded. While nominal labelling of 
grants seems to guide the local spending to a certain degree (the flypaper result), following the 
standard arguments of fiscal federalism literature, it seems beneficial to allow leeway in 
municipal spending decisions when municipalities have varying preferences towards different 
spending categories. This interpretation of our findings is also supported by interviews which 
were done with few municipal officials (see AP8).   
 
7. Conclusions 
This study examined the Finnish system of high school education funding and its effects on the 
local high school spending. Utilizing exogenous variation in high school grants arising from a 
piecewise linear grant formula, we estimated a statistically significant positive effect of grants on 
high school spending with multiple different model specifications. Although the magnitude and 
significance of this effect varied to some extent, invariably insignificant grant effects on 
municipal tax rates and tax revenues support the presence of a flypaper effect. The distinctive 
feature of our study is that we examine also heterogeneity in grant responses. According to our 
results a larger share of elderly residents is related to a lower propensity to spend on education 
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out of high school grant funding. This result lends support to the intergenerational conflict of 
education spending hypothesis. In addition we analyzed heterogeneity with respect to several 
other municipal characteristics, such as voter turnout, local council size, and social and 
healthcare spending. 
In future analyses, some aspects of our study could be improved upon. First, due 
to data limitations our analysis was restricted to the municipal/organizer level. Thus the 
mechanism underlying the allocation of grants at the school level is left unrevealed. Second, the 
examination of heterogeneous responses to grants would require a more careful account of the 
endogeneity. Especially the demographic structure of a municipality is likely to be endogenous 
due to Tiebout type sorting, as older citizens move to areas which provide less schooling 
services to begin with. Third, our results mainly concern a restricted subset of Finnish high 
schools as the municipalities for which the grant formula is relevant are relatively small. 
Consequently we are wary of making generalizations concerning larger organizers of high school 
education from our results.  
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APPENDIX 
AP1 Further summary statistics 
Table A1 Summary statistics for municipal organizers with multiple schools  
Variable N Mean SD Median Min Max
High school education costs, €/student 639 6682.59 1179.65 6410.51 4514.42 13151.34
Grant €/student 639 6007.86 848.12 5919.38 4932.48 9841.00
Cost vs. Grant difference, €/student 639 674.74 835.35 563.15 -1499.92 4041.14
Students (previous fall) 639 1278.69 1546.73 823.00 119.00 8835.00
SOHC net costs €/resident* 638 3252.63 355.78 3224.42 2491.75 4328.00
Tax income €/resident 639 3823.64 645.62 3707.84 2551.81 7637.18
Population 522 69777.31 96771.20 37985.00 6845.00 621000.00
0-14 year olds, share of total 522 0.17 0.03 0.17 0.12 0.25
15-19 year olds, share of total 522 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.09
20-24 year olds, share of total 522 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.12
Over 65 year olds, share of total 522 0.17 0.04 0.17 0.08 0.31
Municipal election vote turnout 130 59.40 5.16 58.70 50.90 79.50
Municipal loan stock, €/resident 633 2081.03 1175.44 1906.06 1.29 7165.00
Municipal income tax rate 639 18.83 1.04 18.75 15.00 22.00
Size of local council  130 51.85 12.12 51.00 27.00 85.00
Taxable income, t-1, €/resident 639 16575.32 3611.52 15853.62 10772.61 39268.51
Other state transfers, €/resident 638 1252.15 591.58 1215.25 9.03 3227.00
Municipal staff (per 1000 residents) 638 61.75 13.60 61 29 134
 
*Net costs are the difference between the gross operating cost and operating income. Some SOHC-services have user fees, 
thus net costs can be seen as a more informative cost measure.  
 
Table A2 Summary statistics by the grant formula thresholds   
Mean values  Interval 
Variable  <40 ≥ 40  <60 ≥ 60  <200 ≥ 200 
Cost per student 20752.83 11698.57 8340.19 6368.57
Grant per student 14832.75 10614.06 7470.47 5541.74
Students 27.08 51.48 120.12 325.39
Observations on the interval 84 171 1839 810
 
Standard deviations 
Interval 
Variable  <40 ≥ 40  <60 ≥ 60  <200 ≥ 200 
Cost per student 10113.18 1976.12 1497.06 796.64
Grant per student 4107.98 1272.84 1188.98 448.96
Students 9.14 5.54 39.52 138.00
Observations on the interval 84 171 1839 810
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AP2 Descriptive correlation analysis   
 
Table A3 Pairwise correlations      
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 High school costs (€/student)  1               
1
2 Students -0.46 1
-0.21 1
3 Total population -0.39 0.90 1
-0.18 0.98 1
4 Share of 15-19 year old -0.35 0.20 0.10 1
-0.32 -0.08 -0.11 1
5 Share 65 and over 0.35 -0.48 -0.47 -0.62 1
0.39 -0.30 -0.27 -0.55 1
6 SOHC-costs (€/resident) 0.49 -0.36 -0.32 -0.48 0.72 1 
0.48 -0.07 -0.06 -0.46 0.71 1 
7 Taxable income (€/resident) -0.24 0.59 0.70 -0.06 -0.46 -0.24 1 
-0.26 0.47 0.43 0.00 -0.48 -0.20 1 
8 Municipal income tax rate  0.32 -0.26 -0.15 -0.16 0.30 0.66 -0.11 1
0.33 -0.24 -0.19 -0.15 0.37 0.64 -0.28 1
 
Upper correlation coefficient includes only one school municipal organizers, lower all municipal organizers. 
Correlations with population share use the original variables without the 2001-2002 replacement (see footnote 10 in the main text). 
 
The negative correlation of per student costs with the number of students implies economies of scale. 
Larger organizers do spend more in terms of total sums of course, but in per student terms they 
generally spend less than smaller organizers. Two demographic share variables have negative 
correlation with each other as expected. Elderly people also tend to locate more in smaller rural areas as 
its correlation is negative with the total population. Interestingly, the share of elderly shows positive 
correlation with both the high school costs and SOHC-costs. In latter case this is expected, but the 
former would suggest that high school education is favored more in municipalities with higher share of 
elderly people. As Fletcher and Kenny (2008) point out, although the high share of elderly may shift the 
local preferences towards less education spending in total, it also means a lower share of school age 
population, which in fact can increase the per pupil spending.  The share of high school age population 
shows little correlation with the total population, while the actual number of high school students 
shows an expected large correlation with it. Larger municipalities however often have large populations 
of higher education students (university students) and working age people. Consequently the share of 
15-19 might be relatively low although the absolute size of this age group would be large. In fact, we 
see that the correlation between the share of high school population and total population turns negative 
when larger municipalities are added. Income level has expected correlations given the fact that larger 
municipalities generally are wealthier. The correlations with the tax rate show that municipalities seem 
to tax more in order to finance the higher social and healthcare costs often due to the aging population. 
Among single school municipalities, tax rates show relatively little correlation with the income level, 
suggesting that income level may have relatively small relationship to the level of public spending 
among these communities. The correlation between tax rate and income level becomes slightly stronger 
when organizers with many schools included.  
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AP3 McCrary (2008) test for the discontinuity of the running variable 
 
Here we first conduct the McCrary (2008) test of discontinuity for the running variable density (see 
Fig. A1). We have limited the examination to the municipal organizers with one school. Based on this 
test, only at the threshold of 200 the distribution is sufficiently smooth in order to guarantee that no 
manipulation assumption is valid. Since McCrary test requires the pre-binning of the data, Cattaneo et 
al. (2016a; 2016b) have suggested a test that avoids the definition of this additional parameter. 
Moreover their approach uses a bandwidth selection that generally yields smaller bandwidths. Below we 
employ additional testing using their robust bias-corrected test statistic, with a second order polynomial 
for the density estimation and third order polynomial for the bias correction. We also allow asymmetric 
bandwidths on each side of the thresholds. Now we cannot reject the null hypothesis of continuity in 
any of thresholds. Intuitively this is expected as closer the threshold we are, the harder it is to reject this 
null. Anyhow the threshold of 60 is still the “worst performing” as it obtains the lowest p-value, thus 
being closest to rejection. Lastly we test, whether the first derivative of the running variable density is 
continuous at the thresholds. To test this, we regress the number of observations in each bin (using bin 
width of 2) on the flexible polynomial function (third order) of the student number (centered at the 
kink) and the corresponding slope change variable. The coefficient in this regression for the slope 
change should be statistically insignificant. In none of the regressions the slope change has a significant 
coefficient, which lends credibility for the validity of no manipulation.  
 
[Fig. A1 on the next page] 
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AP8 Anecdotal interview observations 
Here we briefly present some additional insights about the workings of Finnish high school funding by 
presenting anecdotal observations gathered from the interviews with the municipal officials. The 
purpose of these interviews was to see whether our empirical findings reflect the real-life practices of 
the municipal governance in any way. We interviewed three municipal officers in charge of education 
policy and funding in their municipalities. We had one quite large municipality with multiple schools, 
one smaller municipality with a single school and other smaller municipality with a Finnish and Swedish 
school. Obviously these interviews represent opinions of only few individuals and they should be 
considered accordingly. The following excerpts are informally translated by the authors. 
 
1. “The whole sum that is given to the municipality goes towards high school education, at least here in […].  I 
know municipalities where it does not.” (Respondent A) 
2. “In another municipality where I was, we got more state funding than we used for education.” (Respondent C)  
3. “Yes, municipalities do have some freedom in how they use state grants according to their needs – money is not 
earmarked. They could for example take from high school education and build roads. This however does not 
happen.” (Respondent B) 
4. “State grants do not anyway cover all the high school expenses…” (Respondent B) 
5.  “[…] however I do know some smaller municipalities where there is a more direct relationship between the state 
funding and the amount of how much is spent on education. We do not have so direct link, our budget here won’t  
function so that it’s just what we get from state and that’s it […]” (Respondent A) 
6. “[…] many times we are asked that do they meet each other – the amount we get from state and whether it is 
equivalent to the amount we spend on education, so that this incidence is sort of a problem for us.” 
(Respondent C) 
7. “I imagine that larger municipalities might have some incentives to use the high school funding more efficiently by 
merging school etc., but smaller municipalities do not have this kind of leeway.” (Respondent B) 
8. “[…] I don’t know whether we add anything from our own money to state grant for high school education. Just 
for the sake of interest, should actually work out the numbers and see whether the state grant is enough. I don’t 
know have we ever even separated the high school expenditures from the other education spending.” 
(Respondent C) 
9. “[…] if we then see this from the municipality’s side, sure, municipality or organizer itself of course decides how 
much funding it ultimately puts in, regardless of the amount of state funding […]” (Respondent A)   
The above excerpts vividly illustrate that spending practices among municipalities do differ. In certain 
places the incidence between spending and grants seems less pronounced than in others (1., 2., 4., & 
5.). It is also striking that incidence is not necessarily always known even by the municipalities 
themselves (6. & 8.). This is not necessarily surprising as effectively high school grants go to the same 
municipal budget than any other source of income. Thus it may be that the incidence of grants and 
spending is difficult to judge from the total budget (8.). There also seemed to be understanding of the 
general purpose nature of the funds (3. & 9.). Respondents also commented that the current system 
where organizers have the leeway to decide over funding is preferred to a system that would give 
money more directly to schools. According to them, the latter system would unnecessarily restrict the 
discretionary decision making abilities of municipalities since they know better at the local level the 
exact costs of running each individual schools.          
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AP9 DATA DESCRIPTION APPENDIX 
General description and sources 
Our raw data combines two main sources of data. The data on high schools comes from the National 
Board of Education funding data repository (see link below). This data is annually collected and it 
forms the basis of the state grant funding system. From the repository, we utilize the cost data of high 
schools, which includes the realized costs and the allocated grants, both in per student terms. The basis 
of the allocated grants is the number of students in each fall of the schooling year, as described in the 
paper. This information can also be found from the repository. The raw data covers all organizers of 
high school education (municipal, private, and joint municipal organizers) except for the practice 
schools that operate under universities. The original monetary values are in nominal values. Thus we 
deflate them to values of 2014 using the public sector expenditure index for education sector provided 
by Statistics Finland. The municipal level variables on the number of high schools, socio-economic 
characteristics, and election outcomes are provided by Statistics Finland. The municipal level monetary 
variables have been deflated to 2014 values with the public sector expenditure index for administrative 
costs, except for the social and healthcare costs, for which we have used the public sector expenditure 
index for social and health care sector.  
The sources for the raw data: 
 The high school funding data page is at: https://vos.oph.fi/rap/   
o We use the high school (“Lukiokoulutus”) cost tables at organizer level (table label 
K06G60) which lists expenditures and grants and the corresponding number of 
students. Here the link uses year 2013 as an example: 
https://vos.oph.fi/rap/kust/v13/raportit.html 
 
 The municipal level data come from various tables of Statistics Finland.  
o Main source is the municipal finance and operations tables for years 1975-2014 at: 
http://pxnet2.stat.fi/PXWeb/pxweb/fi/Kuntien_talous_ja_toiminta/?rxid=0cc7f15a-
1506-4b71-8f24-f4c8998721f4  
 Note that tables above are not updated anymore and new versions of the tables 
have been gathered from 2015. 
o Municipal election data comes from: http://www.stat.fi/til/kvaa/index.html 
 The number of students comes from the statistics portal of National Board of Education, but 
the original source also for this database is Statistics Finland. https://vipunen.fi/fi-fi 
 The public sector cost indices are from: http://www.stat.fi/til/jmhi/ 
Additional remarks 
The above sources concern the raw data. For the final data we have made some minor corrections 
concerning for example the temporal inconsistencies in the number of high schools for certain 
organizers. The final data is available by request from authors. The restrictions applied to get the used 
estimation sample are described in the paper. Recall that we concentrate only on municipal organizers. 
Moreover our estimation strategy limits sample size as only a subset of observations is used by the 
methodology.          
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